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QUESTIONS OF FACT IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW: A RESPONSE TO ALLEN &
PARDO’S FACTS IN LAW AND FACTS OF LAW
Paul F. Kirgis*
In their article Facts in Law and Facts of Law, 1 Professor Ronald Allen and Michael
Pardo criticize efforts to distinguish questions of ‘law’ from questions of ‘fact’ based on the
nature of the issue under consideration. In convincing fashion, they demonstrate that there is no
ontological, epistemological, or analytical distinction between things in the real world that are
‘facts’ and things in the real world that are ‘law.’ Their analysis rests on several insights: that
everything we think of as ‘law’ exists and requires proof through evidence just like all the things
we think of as ‘facts;’ that ‘fact-finding’ requires the invocation of norms just like the
identification of legal rules does; and that propositions of ‘law’ have truth values just like
propositions of ‘fact.’ From these insights, Allen and Pardo conclude that when judges use the
terms ‘fact’ and ‘law,’ they are using those terms conventionally to describe a normative
conclusion that a particular matter should be decided by a judge (law) or should be decided by a
jury (fact). 2
This is a powerful critique.

Allen and Pardo are certainly correct that ‘law’ is no

different from any other real-world phenomena normally considered to be ‘factual.’ As they
suggest, the question of what constitutes valid law in any given context is a factual question, and
one that can be answered only by examining the activities of legal officials in their identification
of law. Law is a social institution manifested in and constructed by the actions of legal actors. It
is, therefore, thoroughly factual in nature. That is the insight underlying the social sources thesis
of legal positivism.

Efforts to distinguish ‘laws’ from ‘facts’ at this level—in relation to

questions about the nature of law—will always fail.
demonstrates this important jurisprudential point.

Allen and Pardo’s analysis aptly

But demonstrating that point does not do much to advance understanding of the fact-law
distinction as a practice. Despite the truism that ‘law’ and ‘fact’ are not mutually exclusive
ontological, epistemological, or analytical categories, in practice judges invoke the fact-law
distinction in fundamentally consistent ways every day. As proof of this contention, consider the
following two questions: 1) ‘How fast was the car going?’ 2) ‘What was the speed limit?’ We
do not have to believe that ‘law’ and ‘fact’ are severable categories to recognize that any judge
encountering those questions in a typical adjudicative context would label the first one a question
of fact and the second a question of law. If the objective is to shed light on the fact-law
distinction as it is used in the real world, the method must be to identify the circumstances under
which judges use the labels ‘law’ and ‘fact’ in practice. 3
Allen and Pardo seem to recognize the need for such a pragmatic analysis in their
argument that conventional meanings of the terms ‘fact’ and ‘law’ and structural considerations
about the competence of potential decision-makers inform choices about the allocation of
decisional responsibility. 4 But they never explain how these factors actually operate in practice.
Conventional meanings derive from usage. Speakers of a language have a shared understanding
of the meanings of most words in that language based on the characteristics of the phenomena to
which the words in the language are used to refer. If I say ‘I am sitting in a chair,’ you know
what I mean because you have an idea about the characteristics of the thing that English speakers
call a ‘chair.’ By the same token, when judges say ‘This is a factual matter, so it should go to the
jury,’ they are evaluating the characteristics of the matter to be decided and concluding that there
2

is something about it that indicates it falls into the class of things that we typically assign to
juries. To the extent it is possible to identify the factors judges use to make those choices, then it
is also possible to give substance to the fact-law distinction.

By giving primacy to the

conventional meanings of the terms ‘law’ and ‘fact,’ Allen and Pardo appear to concede this and
to suggest that it would be possible to identify at least some of the characteristics of the things
that judges call ‘fact questions’ and ‘law questions.’ But they never do that.
Furthermore, it does not help much to say that functional considerations play an
important role in the decision to label a question ‘factual’ or ‘legal,’ because the functional
considerations are themselves dependent on the characteristics of the matter to be decided. If it
is correct that, because of differing competencies, there is a set of questions that judges should
normally decide and a set of questions that juries should normally decide, then there must be
particular features about typical adjudicative questions that make them candidates for one or the
other set.

To understand how functional considerations operate, we need to know the

characteristics of the questions that we think judges (or juries) are best suited to answer.
Identifying the characteristics of the questions that judges label ‘fact’ and ‘law’ is an essential
step in understanding the different structural roles of judges and juries.
In short, while Allen and Pardo have said much that is true and nothing that is false, they
have not succeeded in dispelling confusion about the fact-law distinction as it is used in practice.
In a forthcoming article, I attempt to dispel that confusion in at least one context by examining
the fact-law distinction as it animates the right to a jury trial in civil litigation in the United
3

States.5 Here, I will distill that analysis to provide a more general, if somewhat truncated,
account of the fact-law distinction. In brief, I will argue that it is possible to identify consistent
criteria in how the fact-law distinction has been applied in practice by focusing on two factors: 1)
the purpose for which a given question is asked; and 2) the inferences required to answer that
question. Judges decide questions whose purpose is to determine whether the parties have set an
issue up for decision consistent with governing legal norms. Once it has been determined by the
judge that an appropriate issue has been presented, the judge must decide who should resolve
that issue.

Judges have traditionally concluded that juries should resolve issues requiring

inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences put in dispute, while judges
themselves may answer questions calling for deductive inferences or inductive inferences about
matters outside the transactions or occurrences in dispute.
This is a descriptive claim, and a relatively modest descriptive claim at that. My goal is
to uncover the characteristics of the questions that judges usually label as ‘fact,’ and,
correspondingly, the characteristics of the questions that judges usually label as ‘law.’ I do not
claim that judges explicitly rely on the understanding I suggest or that my approach explains all
invocations of the fact-law distinction. I also do not, for now, claim that judges should use the
criteria I describe. Rather, I hope to show that there is a basic underlying consistency in how the
terms ‘fact’ and ‘law’ have been used in the allocation of decisional responsibility. Recognizing
the basis for that consistency can help to focus thinking on the choices judges make in assigning
decisions to legal actors, and thereby lead to better-reasoned decisions.
4

Two Contexts for the Fact-Law Terminology
As Allen and Pardo’s critique persuasively shows, the key to drawing useful conclusions
about the fact-law distinction is to focus not on the meanings of terms, but on the behavior of
judicial actors invoking the fact-law distinction in practice. The first step in understanding how
the fact-law distinction is used in practice is to understand how the decision process operates.
The received wisdom holds that there is something called ‘law’ and something called ‘fact’ and
when the two meet there is something called ‘the application of law to fact.’6 But that is an
artificial decisional framework (for all the reasons Allen and Pardo give) and one that obfuscates
rather than clarifies.

To illuminate the fact-law distinction in practice, we need a better

paradigm—one that is not itself dependent on the fact-law construct. At least in the AngloAmerican system, such a paradigm can be found by focusing on the adversarial process.
In the Anglo-American system, the parties, through their lawyers, initiate the adjudicative
process. The decision-makers—be they judges, juries, or some other kind of referee—do not
have the power to seek out and resolve disputes. No adjudicative decision is made unless the
parties to the dispute put an issue up for decision in an appropriate tribunal. 7 The process of
raising an issue for decision begins when one of the parties invokes the power of a court. The
parties then set the machinery of decision in motion by first putting before the tribunal a body of
data on which a decision may be based and then submitting a question to be answered in
reference to the data. This two-step process recurs throughout the litigation, first through the
submission of motions and later through the introduction of evidence at trial and the submission
5

of jury instructions. The process of adjudication, then, consists not of the application of ‘laws’ to
‘facts,’ but of the presentation of data by the parties and the submission, again by the parties, of
questions about the data.
The fact-law terminology is used in two distinctly different ways in this process. 8 First,
the term ‘law’ is used to describe actions taken by the judge in the role of adjudicative
supervisor.

In this role, the judge monitors the actions of the parties to ensure that the

adjudicative process unfolds in a way that comports with relevant norms. The judge makes a
number of ‘screening’ decisions about such matters as whether the parties have chosen an
appropriate forum (jurisdiction), whether they have presented appropriate data for consideration
(evidence), and whether they have posed appropriate questions (stating a claim, judgment as a
matter of law).
To see how this process works, assume a plaintiff in an American jurisdiction files a
complaint alleging that the defendant acted negligently and thereby caused emotional suffering
to the plaintiff. Assume also that it is an accepted rule of American law that damages for
emotional suffering are not available for conduct that is merely negligent. If the case gets that
far, the plaintiff will ultimately ask a jury or judge to answer a number of questions, including
whether the defendant acted negligently and whether any such negligence caused emotional
suffering in the plaintiff. Now assume that the defendant files a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim (the traditional demurrer). In this motion, the defendant is asking for a decision on
whether the plaintiff’s proposed question—‘Did the defendant’s negligence cause the plaintiff
6

emotional suffering?’—is appropriate. The judge answers that question (presumably in the
negative) because it is part of the judge’s ‘screening’ role to decide whether the questions posed
by the parties are appropriate.
The decisions the judge makes in this ‘screening’ role are frequently referred to as
matters of ‘law.’ Yet these screening decisions frequently involve determinations about the facts
of the case. To determine whether the court has jurisdiction, for example, the court must
investigate and draw conclusions about the nature of the dispute and the characteristics of the
parties before it.9 To determine whether data presented by the parties is appropriate, the court
must apply rules of evidence, such as the hearsay rule, that require the court to draw inferences
about the events in dispute.10

And to decide whether a question posed by the parties is

appropriate on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court must evaluate the parties’
factual allegations to determine whether a reasonable jury could find the facts to be as the parties
claim. Although all of these matters involve decisions on what we think of as the facts of the
case, we assign them to the judge because we believe the judge is best suited to answer them.
We call them matters of law because we have assigned them to the judge. Criticisms of the factlaw distinction as ‘artificial and problematic’ have greatest force in this context. 11
But the fact-law terminology also appears in a different context. Once the judge has
determined that the dispute is in a proper forum, that the parties have presented appropriate data,
and that the parties have posed an appropriate question, she must decide which judicial actor—
judge or jury—should answer the question. Traditionally, judges have made this choice by
7

reference to the fact-law distinction. Questions that judges label as ‘fact’ go to the jury in cases
in which a jury is properly demanded. Questions that judges label as ‘law’ sometimes go to the
jury as well, but may also be decided by the judge. In civil cases in the United States, where
civil jury trials still exist, this division of responsibility is constitutionally prescribed by the
Seventh Amendment.12
For the remainder of this article, I will concentrate on the fact-law distinction as it
appears in this context. Because it is at this point that the merits of the case are decided, this is
the point at which the fact-law distinction carries the greatest import. It also seems to be the
point at which most of the confusion surfaces. Nobody seriously thinks juries should decide
questions such as whether the court has jurisdiction or whether a document offered in evidence is
hearsay. But there is heated debate about matters such as whether juries should interpret the
claims in a patent, to give one example to which I will return. If we are to clarify the fact-law
distinction, we must be able to identify the characteristics of the questions that judges
traditionally assign to juries, and of the questions that judges traditionally reserve for themselves,
once the merits have been reached.
An Inferential Understanding of the Fact-Law Distinction
The persistence of the fact-law terminology in judicial decisions allocating decisional
responsibility between judge and jury—despite the repeated condemnations of the fact-law
distinction as chimerical—suggests that judges believe the distinction has a basis. I agree. There
is something about certain questions that leads judges to conclude that those questions are
8

‘factual’ as opposed to ‘legal.’ While judges may not consciously recognize it, the basis for the
distinction lies in the types of inferences required to answer a given question. In short, the
questions that judges typically label as ‘fact’ are screened questions requiring inductive
inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute. All other questions are typically
labeled as ‘law.’
Before proceeding, I should define some terms. First, I use the term ‘inductive inference’
broadly, to encompass all probabilistic reasoning. This means I use the term to include the
Peircean concept of abduction or hypothesis, 13 a type of reasoning that has frequently been
considered an independent category of inference. In effect, I lump all non-syllogistic reasoning
into the category of induction. 14

Focusing on the kinds of inferences most prevalent in

adjudication, then, I use the term inductive inference to encompass three basic types of
inferences: 1) that an event or condition in the past or present probably has occurred or is
occurring; 2) that an event or condition in the future probably will occur; and 3) that a
hypothetical event or condition probably would occur given some postulated set of
circumstances, a type of reasoning known as the counterfactual conditional.15 The term ‘event or
condition’ in these formulations includes virtually all phenomena in the world, real or
hypothetical, including the identity of things or persons, the occurrence of physical events or
human acts, mental states, and relations of cause and effect.
Second, I use the term ‘transactions or occurrences in dispute’ in the sense it has in the
American law of res judicata.16 This is a term of art, but its meaning is fairly straightforward. In
9

litigation, the plaintiff must always assert that some event or condition—defined broadly as
above—occurred and impacted the plaintiff or will impact the plaintiff in a negative way. The
plaintiff thus sets the terms of the debate by identifying something that happened (or in some
cases, will happen) causing an injury that the plaintiff claims is remediable in a court of law. The
defendant responds by challenging the plaintiff’s version of the events and/or adding new events
or conditions that have a logical connection to those posited by the plaintiff and that are
necessary for a full understanding of the events or conditions described by the plaintiff. The
‘transactions or occurrences in dispute’ are simply the events or conditions that the plaintiff has
pointed to as causing his injury, plus the injury itself, plus logically connected events or
conditions identified by the defendant.
Last, I should emphasize again that judges routinely make decisions on fact questions as I
define them, while acting in their screening role.

In deciding whether data is appropriate

(evidence questions) or whether a question posed by the parties is appropriate (as on motions to
dismiss or for judgment as a matter of law), the judge must draw inferences about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute. These sorts of questions are probably best considered fact
questions decided by a judge. Unfortunately, they have traditionally been labeled questions of
law, and judges seem unlikely to change that understanding. To receive the label ‘fact question,’
then, a question must have survived the judge’s initial screening and require inductive inferences
about the transactions or occurrences in dispute.

10

To demonstrate the utility of this understanding of the fact-law distinction, I will give
some examples of common adjudicative questions. The most common sort of ‘fact’ questions in
adjudication are the ‘who, what, when, where’ questions.

These questions call for inductive

inferences about past real-world events or conditions. For example, assume that in a slip-and-fall
case, to show that the floor of a store was wet at the time of the accident, the plaintiff calls a
witness who saw a customer spill water on the floor just before the plaintiff’s fall. To reach the
desired conclusion, the decision-maker must make a probabilistic inference first that the spill
occurred as the witness described it and then that the spilled water was still on the floor when the
plaintiff fell. This is a classic example of an inductive inference about the transactions or
occurrences in dispute.
Adjudication also involves predictive inferences about future events or conditions, most
often in the remedies context. For example, in deciding whether to issue an injunction, a
decision-maker must decide whether the actions of the defendant will cause irreparable harm if
allowed to continue. Personal injury actions often involve determinations of future lost earnings
as well as future pain and suffering. Breach of contract actions may involve determinations of
future lost profits. All these matters require probabilistic conjectures about events in the future.
Because those events are part of the set of events or conditions that the plaintiff has identified as
triggering a right to recovery, these matters also involve inductive inferences about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute.

11

Finally, perhaps the most problematic type of inference in adjudication is the
determination of causation. As H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré made clear in their masterful
Causation in the Law,17 causation is best understood in terms of expected courses of events.
Their explanation of the two aspects of tort causation, ‘but-for’ cause and ‘proximate’ or ‘legal’
cause, is worth quoting:
The necessity of the cause for the production of the consequence means that, in
making causal statements, we must consult our knowledge of the general course of
events. Under what sorts of conditions do things of this sort happen? Does this
kind of thing happen without that kind of thing? The second aspect [proximate or
legal cause] forces us to consider less definite issues and very often matters of
degree. Although principles distinguishing between causes and mere conditions, or
between factors which ‘break the chain’ of causation and those which do not, are to
be found in ordinary thought apart from the law, their application often raises
disputable questions of classification: Was this a coincidence? How likely was it?
. . . In these questions the issue is not so much: ‘Did X happen?’ but rather ‘Is
what happened sufficiently like the standard case of an X to be classified with it for
legal purposes?’18
In other words, determining whether event A is the but-for cause of event B requires postulating
a likely course of events and asking whether event B would be likely to occur in the absence of
event A. Determining whether event A is the proximate or legal cause of event B requires similar
but more nuanced considerations.

The decision-maker must decide whether event A is

sufficiently extraordinary given the expected course of events to be designated a ‘cause’ rather
than a ‘condition’ of event B for purposes of assigning fault.
In their dependence on likely courses of events, both questions of but-for cause and
questions of proximate cause require probabilistic inferences about hypothetical conditions in the
world—the events that were most likely to happen given the state of the world prior to the injury.
12

If the plaintiff cannot show a likely hypothetical world in which his injury would not have
occurred, he cannot recover. Thus, the existence of such a hypothetical world is an aspect of the
transactions or occurrences in dispute, and answering questions of causation requires drawing
inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute.
Now, note what the inferential definition of fact questions excludes. First, the definition
excludes all deductive inferences, regardless of the subject matter. Where inductive inferences
are used to generate new beliefs about the world, deductive inferences are used to classify or
categorize existing beliefs. 19 Deductive inferences are quite common in legal reasoning. 20 Take
the following syllogism as an example:
Anyone who intentionally and unlawfully kills a human being is guilty of murder;
A intentionally and unlawfully killed B;
Therefore, A is guilty of murder.
Once the decisionmaker knows that murder is defined as ‘the intentional and unlawful killing of
a human being’ and knows that a particular defendant has intentionally and unlawfully killed
another, the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of murder follows without any conjecture or
speculation required. A question calling for that sort of inference is always a question of law,
although it is one frequently made by the jury.
Second, the definition excludes questions calling for inferences about the conduct and
mental states of legislators or others in constructing standards or rules of law that are ultimately
determined to have a bearing on the resolution of the dispute. 21 Questions posed in litigation may
call for inductive inferences about these matters, and such inferences may be crucial to the
13

resolution of the dispute. But the parties will almost never assert that the conduct and mental
states of legislators or others constitute the real-world events underlying their claims and
defenses. In other words, plaintiffs very rarely argue that conduct undertaken by a legislative or
judicial actor has caused the plaintiff an injury remediable in a court of law. Occasionally
plaintiffs have attempted to tie their alleged injuries to such legislative action, and the result has
usually been a determination that the plaintiff lacks standing—or in other words, that the
plaintiff’s proposed question is inappropriate. 22
Another major category of inference excluded from the definition is the set of inferences
about the consequences of the litigation itself, such as the effects on the parties or others of a
verdict or award. Again, at various points in the litigation certain actors may consider the
consequences of the litigation in deciding how to resolve the dispute. But the consequences of
the litigation cannot be the events the plaintiff points to as a basis for seeking a remedy in a court
of law or the defendant points to as making applicable a legal defense.
In sum, defining questions of fact in terms of inductive inferences about the transactions
or occurrences in dispute leaves several important classes of questions of law. Whenever a
question requires the decision-maker to label or characterize known real-world phenomena by
reference to the decision-maker’s pre-existing store of knowledge, it involves deductive
inferences. And even if it requires the decision-maker to draw conjectural inferences exceeding
the decision-maker’s pre-existing store of knowledge, so that it calls for inductive inferences, it
does not involve a question of fact if the inferences relate to matters such as the intentions or
14

purposes of a legislature or the likely actions of other people who are made aware of the outcome
of the litigation.
Certain questions in adjudication do not fall neatly into either the ‘law’ or ‘fact’ category.
These are usually characterized as ‘mixed questions of law and fact.’ Reasonableness, as in the
law of negligence, is the classic example. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, the definitive
American source on the law of civil liability for personal injury, defines the standard of conduct
required to avoid being negligent as ‘that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.’ 23 It
states further that ‘[n]egligence is a departure from a standard of conduct demanded by the
community for the protection of others against unreasonable risk.’ 24 Finally, the Restatement
defines unreasonableness: ‘Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as
involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is
of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular
manner in which it is done.’ 25 This is simply another way of saying that reasonableness depends
on the circumstances. People might be justified in taking certain risks if taking those risks is the
only way to avoid worse consequences.
This weighing of risk and utility calls for counterfactual probabilistic inferences about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute. In requiring an inference as to whether other courses of
conduct that the actor might have taken would have produced the same benefits at less cost, the
question of reasonableness requires the decision-maker to speculate about how events might
have unfolded if circumstances had been different. If other actions that could have been taken
15

would not have produced the same benefit at less cost, the actor’s conduct was not unreasonable.
Because this conclusion turns on hypothetical, probabilistic inferences about the actor’s
conduct—an essential component of the transaction or occurrence in dispute—it is a question of
fact.
What makes the reasonableness question difficult to characterize is its invocation of
community standards.

The decision-maker must compare the actor’s conduct against the

community standards for behavior under similar circumstances. Even if the probability of an
injury was low and/or the relative utility of the conduct was high, an actor might be negligent if
he failed to act in ways that community standards dictate for the situation. ‘If the actor does what
others do under like circumstances, there is at least a possible inference that he is conforming to
the community standard of reasonable conduct; and if he does not do what others do there is a
possible inference that he is not so conforming.’26 Thus, a decision-maker must answer the
question, ‘What would a person of ordinary prudence in this community do under these
circumstances?’ Assuming the circumstances leading to the injury have been established—by
assumption, agreement, or prior determination—answering that question does not involve factual
inferences.

Instead of drawing inductive inferences about the specific people and events

involved in the matter, the decision-maker must draw inductive inferences about how other
people from the community would behave under similar circumstances. And almost inevitably,
the decision-maker’s own preconceived notions about how people in the community should
behave will creep into that analysis.

Thus, determining the community standards involves
16

inductive inferences about matters beyond the transactions or occurrences in dispute, as well as
deductive inferences about those transactions or occurrences.
The fact that some questions include both factual and legal elements does not mean that
the fact-law distinction is empty—it just means that the world is a complex place.

And

understanding the fact-law distinction in inferential terms can help judges discern the relative
weight of the factual and legal components in such difficult cases. Sometimes the ‘factual’
components will predominate, while in other instances the ‘legal’ components will predominate.
Courts that are aware of the traditional preference for giving those questions in the former
category to the jury will, at a minimum, make more consistent and better informed decisions
allocating decisional responsibility for difficult questions like reasonableness. To the extent it is
possible to show that juries are better decision-makers for ‘fact’ questions, a challenge I leave on
the table for now, an inferential understanding of the fact-law distinction will produce decisions
that are not just more consistent and better informed, but qualitatively superior.
Caveat: Judicial Manipulation of the Fact-Law Distinction
It should be apparent that the inferential understanding of the fact-law distinction I
propose does not constrain judges in any meaningful sense. Judges can always make a question
into either a fact question or a law question simply by interpreting the legal rule implicated by
the question to require the relevant sorts of inferences. The United States Supreme Court did
exactly that in its decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,27 which held that patent
claim construction is a question of law. The plaintiff in Markman, who wanted the jury to
17

interpret the claims in the patent, relied primarily on Bischoff v. Wethered,28 a case involving a
contract for the assignment of a patent. The plaintiff in Bischoff had determined that a prior
patent had been awarded for an identical invention. If that were true, the presence of the prior
patent would nullify the patent he purchased. He brought an action for breach of contract, in
which the central issue was whether the two inventions were in fact identical. In other words,
the case turned on whether an infringement action would succeed if one were brought. The
Supreme Court understood the construction of the patent to require the mental recreation of the
invention. ‘[T]he whole subject-matter of a patent is an embodied conception outside of the
patent itself . . . . This outward embodiment of the terms contained in the patent is the thing
invented, and is to be properly sought, like the explanation of all latent ambiguities arising from
the description of external things, by evidence in pais.’29 Thus, the Bischoff Court saw the
decision-maker’s role as mentally recreating the invented products based on the patents and the
expert testimony, and then comparing the ‘invention’ described in the first patent to the
‘invention’ described in the second patent to decide whether they are the same. It held that the
jury should make this determination.
The Supreme Court in Markman rejected that approach to patent law.

While it

recognized that a ‘novelty’ action such as Bischoff might turn on the outward embodiment of the
patent, it maintained that a patent infringement action turns on simple document interpretation.
‘Where technical terms are used, or where the qualities or substances or operations mentioned or
any similar data necessary to the comprehension of the language of the patent are unknown to the
18

judge, the testimony of witnesses may be received upon these subjects, and any other means of
information be employed. But in the actual interpretation of the patent the court proceeds upon
its own responsibility, as an arbiter of the law, giving to the patent its true and final character and
force.’30
Bischoff adopted an understanding of patent law that would require the decision-maker to
draw inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute (the outward
embodiment of the patented product). In turn, the Bischoff Court saw patent claim construction
as a question of fact for the jury. Markman rejected that understanding in favor of an approach
focusing on the literal meaning of the words contained in the patent. That approach requires no
inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute. It requires only deductive
inferences about the semantic meanings of the terms in the patent. Accordingly—and rightly
given its understanding of what claim construction actually involves—the Markman Court saw
patent claim construction as a question of law for the judge.
The Supreme Court almost certainly would not have decided Markman differently had it
understood the fact-law distinction in inferential terms. But it might have better understood—
and better explained—why its interpretation of patent law removed claim construction from the
province of the jury. Ron Allen and Michael Pardo are absolutely right that misunderstandings
about the nature of the fact-law distinction have produced ‘conceptual confusion’ in courts. But
they have not provided a solution to that problem. The solution is to better understand the

19

characteristics of the questions that courts label ‘fact’ and of the questions that courts label ‘law.’
Understanding the fact-law distinction in inferential terms can help in that process.

*

Associate Professor, St. John’s University School of Law.
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